Impact of the Increase in Insured Amount of Policy-based Agricultural Insurance on Farmers' Moral Risks: A Quasi-natural Experimental Study Based on Pig Insurance in Henan Province
Agricultural production is highly risky. Agricultural insurance, as a means of social risk dispersion, can effectively disperse agricultural risks, respond to agricultural disasters, and promote agricultural production. Since the insurance moral risk problem caused by information asymmetry isAAAAA more serious in agricultural insurance, how to identify and measure farmers' moral risks is an important issue in the field of empirical research. Based on the pig insurance policy data of Henan Province from 2016 to the first half of 2019, the feed and pig prices in the corresponding period and the epidemic data of Henan Province, this paper uses the Poisson model, ordinary least squares method, Tobit model and panel fixed effect model to identify the impact of changes in the insured amount of policy-based insurance on pig mortality rate, and quantify the moral risks of farmers. The research results show that after the insured amount of the pig policy increased by RMB 300, the pig mortality rate increased by 13.5% and the simple claim ratio of the policy increased by 20.3%. This paper identifies the changes in moral risk of China's agricultural insurance when the insured amount is adjusted from the perspective of micro data, and provides corresponding policy recommendations for the development of policy-based agricultural insurance.
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